For the manager incentive problem,based on set-dependence,this paper incorporated fairness preference into utility function of manager,constructed a new analytical frame for manager incentive,and found that higher wage leads to higher incentive for manager even in the absence of monitor,moreover,the equal fixed wage set by different subjects results in different incentive effect.

By constructing a tenure model of manager, this paper explains the inner mechanism of manager s rentseeking action, and indicates that the relationship between manager s tenure and rentseeking action.

The perfecting of the encouragingconstraint mechanism to enterprise managers is an indispensable part of further reformation of enterprises and the establishment of modern enterprise system.

Moral hazard of enterprise managers refer to a business conduct of economic agents to seek for their maximum personal benefits at the expense of the interests of their clients without facing up to the consequence of their conduct.

Dsigning the enterprise manager s incentive salary system of stock option;

In the socialist economic conditions,normative and scientific appraisal played an important role in building the high quality enterprise managers.

Based on an analysis of the performance appraisal of the intermediate management as well as the incentive mechanism of a listed Chinese company, the paper puts forward such suggestions as how to improve the available performance appraisal of the intermediate management and the incentive mechanism in listed Chinese companies as a whole.