1) incentive intensity
激励强度
1.
In this paper, we set up a model for the quantitative analysis on the incentive intensity and enterprise growth and applied this model to A enterprise.
本文应用投入产出技术,构建了用于分析薪酬激励强度与企业增长关系的量化模型,并将该模型应用到了A公司,发现在固定薪酬不变的条件下,激励强度越大,企业总产出、全员生产率越大,企业劳动效益越小。
2.
Using the principal-agent model,we discussed the relationship between knowledge workers risk preference and the enterprise s incentive intensity under the certain and uncertain conditions.
本文研究了风险偏好与风险成本,分析了知识型员工风险偏好的特征,利用委托代理模型讨论了确定与不确定环境下员工风险偏好与企业激励强度之间的关系,并对如何协调两者的冲突以及知识型员工与企业间协调作用的特征进行了剖析。
3.
The results show that incentive mechanism comprises expired date and incentive intensity, and expired date is effective only if it lies in feasible extent of the project duration, and the minimal incentive intensity is the optimum incentive intensity.
结果表明,激励机制由截至日期和激励强度共同决定,只有当截至日期位于项目工期的可行域时激励机制才是有效的,此时满足工期要求的最小激励强度即为最优的激励强度。
2) excitation density
励磁强度，激励强度
3) Invariable vibratile force
恒定弱激励强度
4) incentive trade-offs
激励强度权衡
5) threshed incentive intensity
门槛型激励强度
1.
From the two aspects that the power transfer task and the energy saving and pollution reduction task are inter-independent and inter-substitutable,the incentive intensity,the threshed incentive intensity and effort levels of GRA are anal.
考虑降耗减排能源战略需求及政策背景,针对发电权交易具有方向性的特点,构建了交易中心和受让发电权电站间的多任务委托代理协调均衡模型,在完成转让电量任务与节能减排任务的努力相互独立和可替代2种情况下,分析了受让发电权电站的激励强度、门槛型激励强度和努力水平,比较了多任务激励与完成转让电量单任务激励下交易中心和受让发电权电站的收益。
6) the executives equity incentive
股权激励强度
1.
Based on Principal-Agent Theory, by sampling among the A-share listed companies in Shenzhen Securities Exchange as of the end of 2004-2006 date, we use correlation analysis and linear regression analysis make an empirical study on the relationship between the executives equity incentive and the company s growth in the Chinese listed company .
本文通过实证分析后发现,高管薪酬中基于权益薪酬的比例(股权激励强度)与公司成长性有着显著的相关关系,并且此相关关系在逐年加强中。
补充资料：表光合强度(见光合强度)
表光合强度(见光合强度)
forecast of sowing or transplanting time
b iaoguanghe qiangdu表光合强度见光合强度
说明：补充资料仅用于学习参考，请勿用于其它任何用途。
参考词条