1) implicit incentive contract
隐性激励合同
1.
The paper analyses combinative incentive contract,including implicit incentive contract based on subjective performance and explicit contract based on objective performance to entrepreneur human capital.
本文主要是对企业家人力资本基于主观业绩的隐性激励合同与客观业绩的显性激励合同的组合激励进行的研究。
2) Implicit Incentives
隐性激励
1.
For the moment,the research on the incentive problems of the manager of the state-owned enterprises focuses on such explicit incentives as annual pay,bonuses,options and so on,but lacking the research of the other part of the incentive mechanism-systematic research on the implicit incentives which based on Managerial Labor Market.
目前,在企业经营者激励问题的研究上,我国理论界对于国企经营者的年薪、奖金、期权、期股等显性激励手段已有较为充分的探讨,而针对激励机制的另一重要方面——通过经理人市场这只无形的手而实现的隐性激励的系统研究却显相对不足。
2.
Based on the recognition of defects in the literatures on implicit incentives accordint to career s concerns,we model manager s multiperiod combinative incentives,derive the optimal incentives,and study the features in the optimal incentives.
本文在现有的基于职业观念的隐性激励文献研究基础上,建立经营者多期组合激励模型,进而得到最优激励,并给出此激励的特征。
3.
For the moment,the research on the incentive problems of the manager of the state-owned enterprises focuses on explicit incentives,but lacks the research on the implicit incentives which bases on Manage- rial Labor Market.
来自经理人市场的隐性激励,是指通过经营者之间的竞争和所有者与经营者之间的长期重复博弈,而形成的一种内生于经营者本身的自我驱动性激励。
3) implicit incentive
隐性激励
1.
The manager s effort comes from the explicit incentive and two implicit incentives (the reputation effect and ratchet effect).
经营者的努力水平不仅来自于显性报酬契约的激励 ,还来自于两种隐性激励—声誉效应和棘轮效应的影响 。
2.
An orderly managerial labor market is the carrier for the liberalization of managerial labor, whilst the implicit incentive from the managerial lab.
企业家才能市场化的载体是有序运转的经理人市场，经理人市场所内含的隐性激励与约束机制是对以业绩报酬为基础的显性激励与约束机制的重要补充。
4) hidden incentive
隐性激励
1.
Management fraud as the fraudulent acts of the manager to pursue opportunistic,which is related to the natural incomplete of managerial compensation contracts,limitation of the performance evaluation index and management and the hidden incentive of the managerial compensation.
管理舞弊作为管理层追求机会主义而实施的欺诈性行为,它与管理报酬契约的天然不完备性、业绩评价指标的缺陷性及管理报酬契约的隐性激励有很大关系。
5) Recessive Motivation
隐性激励
1.
The recessive motivation consists of internal and external motivators.
企业隐性激励是由外部市场竞争性激励和企业内部劳动市场隐含契约性激励共同组成的。
6) explicit incentive contract
显性激励合同
1.
The implicit incentive contract and explicit incentive contract models are given firstly.
本文主要是对企业家人力资本基于主观业绩的隐性激励合同与客观业绩的显性激励合同的组合激励进行的研究。
补充资料：再保险合同与原保险合同之间的关系
再保险合同与原保险合同之间的关系
【再保险合同与原保险合同之间的关系】再保险合同是以原保险合同为基础的合同，同时又是脱离原保险合同的独立合同。 1.再保险合同是以原保险合同为基础的合同。再保险合同是以原保险合同的存在为前提的，主要表现在以下两方面: (1)再保险合同的责任、保险金额和有效期均以原保险合同的范围和有效期为限; (2)原保险合同解除、失效或终止，再保险合同也随之解除、失效或终止。 2.再保险合同在法律上是独立的合同。虽然再保险合同源于原保险合同，但并不是原保险合同的从属合同，两者在法律上是各自独立的合同。 我国《保险法》第二十九条指出:“再保险接受人不得向原保险的投保人要求支付保险费。 原保险的被保险人或者受益人，不得向再保险接受人提出赔偿或者给付保险金的请求。 再保险分出人不得以再保险接受人未履行再保险责任为由，拒绝履行或者迟延履行其原保险责任。” 由此可以看出，再保险合同有自己的双方当事人即原保险人和再保险人;原保险合同中的一方当事人被保险人并不是再保险合同的主体。在权利与义务对价方面，原保险合同的被保险人不能直接向再保险合同的再保险人请求保险金赔偿，他们之间不直接产生权利义务关系;反过来，再保险人也不得向原保险合同投保人请求交付保险费。原保险人不得以再保险人不履行再保险给付义务为由，拒绝或延迟其对被保险方赔付或给付义务。
说明：补充资料仅用于学习参考，请勿用于其它任何用途。
参考词条