1) leader-follower game
主从策略
2) Stackelberg game
主从对策
1.
Investigation into Stackelberg Games in Initial Allocation for Water Rights;
初始水权分配中的主从对策研究
2.
The logistics management in a supply chain of single product from a single seller to multibuyer was studied with a basic Stackelberg game model under the coordination of minimum replenishment period presented,where the seller is leader and the buyers are follower.
研究了一类单卖方、多买方单产品供应链的物流管理,给出了最小补充期协调下的主从对策基本模型,其中卖方为主方,买方为从方·建立了买方成本理性约束下的卖方成本优化模型·并以上海宝钢冷轧板销售系统为对象,应用遗传算法进行了主从对策的仿真实验·实验表明,通过现代物流管理中的最小补充期协调,供应链物流活动的整体利益得以显著改善,双方成本均有不同程度的减少,物流订货补充的主从对策在内部供应链物流管理中的效果尤为明显
3.
The design problem of incentive strategy when there are multiple followers in the Stackelberg game is studied in this paper.
讨论当主从对策中存在多个从方时，主方对多个从方的诱导策略的设计问题。
3) leader-follower decision
主从决策
1.
Hierarchical leader-follower decision is a common issue in organizational management.
多层次主从决策是现实组织管理中经常遇到的问题。
4) leader-follower strategy
主从对策
1.
In the technology transaction,the relationship between patent holders and competitors(potential infringers) is a typical leader-follower strategy.
技术交易中,专利权人与竞争者(潜在的侵权者)之间是典型的主从对策关系,而行动的先后顺序对双方的最终收益会产生重大地影响。
5) leader-follower game
主从对策
1.
Simulitions to distribute interests in Multipolar World are essentially the models of(m,n)-person leader-follower games.
多极世界利益纷争仿真模型本质上就是(m,n)-主从对策模型。
2.
This paper point out a Non-Compatible problem for existing in higher-lower level of leader-follower game system.
指出主从对策系统上下层之间存在不相容问题(即矛盾问题)。
6) stackelberg game
Stackelberg主从对策
1.
This paper through building Stackelberg game model where constructing the Nash equilibrium model assuming subcontract decision variable as endogenetic variable firsts:and then analysis the optimal sol.
本文通过引入Stackelberg主从对策的研究方法,首先假定分包合同决策变量为外生变量的前提下,构建合同双方博弈的Nash均衡模型,进一步在Nash均衡的约束下,从优化第三方物流的整体绩效出发,分析决策变量为内生变量时的最优解,从而把目前局限于委托代理层面的分包合同关系研究推进到了委托代理与合同整体绩效最优决策相结合的层面。
2.
The Stackelberg game model with manufacture as a leader and retailer as a follower is developed,and the essence of this model is the coordination between manufacture\'s online sale pricing and retailer\'s traditional retail pricing.
建立了以制造商为主方,零售商为从方的Stackelberg主从对策模型,该模型实质是制造商在线销售价格与零售商传统销售价格之间协调;给出了需求信息共享和非共享两种情况下的供应链最优协调价格策略;分析了需求预测信息对供应链最优协调价格策略及其利润的影响;最后进行了数值计算,探讨了需求信息参数对供应链及其成员利润的影响。
3.
Based on the characteristic that the retailer has stronger bargaining power under the many-to-one supply chain structure,the Stackelberg game model where the retailer is a leader and the manufacturers are followers,is established.
针对多对一供应链结构中零售商具有较强议价能力的特点,建立了零售商为主方、制造商为从方的Stackelberg主从对策模型;给出在零售商提供契约条款的对称博弈中,制造商生产产品策略存在唯一最优解的证明;分析了零售商契约参数变量的决策问题;讨论了收入共享契约下分散供应链同集中供应链决策的关系。
补充资料：主从
1.主人与仆从。 2.主要的和从属的。
说明：补充资料仅用于学习参考，请勿用于其它任何用途。
参考词条