1) whole motivated covenant
全员激励盟约
1.
The whole motivated covenant focuses on all staffs who covenant.
全员激励盟约突出组织全员的加盟 ,并通过加盟全员对组织快速增长价值的彻底共享 ,来有效解决组织内部知识创新的垄断性和外部性 ,以主动适应新经济环境发展的需
2) sound incentive and constraint mechanism
健全激励约束机制
3) incentive constraint
激励约束
1.
This paper improves traditional incentive constraint contract,in which assumed principal was always risk neutral,and gives an amended result of principal-agent contract on condition that principal is risk avoidable.
改进了传统人才激励约束合同设计中的主体风险中性的假定,提出了在主体风险规避假定下委托-代理合同的修改结果。
4) incentive contract
激励契约
1.
Artificially-designed incentive contracts incompletion and executing difficulty in organization;
组织内人工设计的激励契约不完备性与履约障碍
2.
The Study of Design and Efficiency of Incentive Contract of China Handler Market;
我国经理人市场激励契约设计与效率研究
3.
Based on coordination work,an incentive contract model is presented,while the affections of information sharing are considered.
本文分析了由供应商、制造商和第三方物流企业(3PLs)组成的物流外包系统,考虑了供应商和制造商信息共享程度的影响,建立了协同工作环境下的激励契约模型。
5) incentive and restraint
激励约束
1.
State-owned assets Supervise、Principal-agent、Incentive and restraint;
国有资产监管、委托代理与激励约束
2.
These special characteristics make the corporate administration mechanism-the incentive and restraint mechanism for the managers ineffective.
我国上市公司的股权结构呈现国有股权比重大、股权过于集中、股权分置等独特的特点,这些特殊的股权结构特点导致公司治理机制———对经营者的激励约束机制失效。
3.
In the historical development of the incentive and restraint mechanism,the US corporate governance underwent four stages,i.
以激励约束机制变化为依据,把美国公司治理变迁划分为经理人员控制权地位的确立、经理人员职权的扩大、独立董事制度的引入和从强调激励到激励约束并重四个阶段。
6) incentive contracts
激励契约
1.
Performance Standards Difference, Reputation Heterogeneity and Design of Incentive Contracts;
绩效标准差异、声誉异质性与激励契约设计
2.
Our paper use a model of client-agent to analyse the relation between accounting information and the design of managers incentive contracts.
旨在研究会计信息在经理人激励契约设计中的作用。
3.
Then,why do debt and dividend lie in the incentive contracts simultaneously? This paper illustrates that the rigidity of debt has an advantage in controlling moral hazard,but is not enough in eliminating adverse selection.
信息传递理论和代理成本理论认为,在激励契约中,负债和现金股利可以相互替代,但是现实中负债与现金股利却共存于激励契约。
补充资料：工业企业全员劳动生产率
工业企业全员劳动生产率是指在一定时期内工业企业平均每个职工在单位时间内创造的工业增加值。它是反映工业活劳动投入的经济效益指标，是企业生产技术水平、经营管理水平。职工技术熟练程度和劳动积极性的综合表现。其计算公式为：工业企业全员劳动生产率（元／人）=报告期累计工业增加值 /报告期全部职工平均人数公式中累计工业增加值按不变价格计算。职工平均人数是指报告期内每天平均拥有的从业人员人数。分月、季、半年、年平均人数。
说明：补充资料仅用于学习参考，请勿用于其它任何用途。
参考词条