With China listed companies\' data in 2005,the paper analyzes the empirical relation between large shareholders\' ultimate cash flow rights and debt leverage,and checks out the governance effect of debt\'s non-dilution property and bankruptcy mechanism.

Ultimate control rights,cash flow rights and firm value—Empirical research of Chinese publicly listed companies based on recessive ultimate control rights;

The paper finds that the cash flow invested by shareholders is less than controlling rights they obtained.

The study adopts the method developed by La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer(1999),which traces the chain of ownership to find who is the controlling shareholders of firm,analyze the influence to the value of corporation because of controlling shareholders control rights deviating from cash flow rights,then examine the evidence on expropriation of minority shareholders.

The separation of cash flow rights and voting rights is severe.

Based on the issue of ultimate ownership,this paper retraces the control-chain of listed companies,it shows that most listed companies do not separate the control rights from the cash flow rights.

standardized operation; In addition, it can also make control right and cash flow right deviate from through the ultimate holding way, make it can achieve the goal of controlling the company actually with smaller s.