1) constrained buy back contract
限制性回购契约
1.
In this paper,a constrained buy back contract which can avoid these flaws is put forward,and a numerical example is given at last.
已有的回购契约或者无法协调供应链,或者需要一定的费用执行契约,本文所提出的限制性回购契约能够避免这些不足,最后给出算例分析。
2) buy-back contract mechanism
回购契约机制
1.
Three buy-back contract mechanisms of supply chain are proposed in collaboration with return logistics cost burdened by retailers, suppliers or both parties.
分别讨论退货物流成本由零售商承担、供应商承担或双方共同承担等3种情形下供应链协作的回购契约机制设计问题,并通过数值实验进行分析讨论。
2.
The article demonstrates the non-reasonability of buy-back contract mechanism of traditional supply chain,puts forward to adopt Stackelberg model and Nash negotiation model to design buy-back contract.
论证了传统供应链回购契约机制的不合理性,提出采用Stackelberg模型与Nash协商模型来设计回购契约。
3) Buy back contract
回购契约
1.
In a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain facing stochastic sales effort dependent demand,it is proved that supply chain coordination can not be achieved by using traditional buy back contract when retailer is a leader and supplier is a follower.
以包含一个制造商和一个零售商的两层供应链为研究对象,当零售商是领导者,供应商是跟随者,并且需求和促销努力相关时,证明传统的回购契约已不能够使得供应链协调。
2.
For two stage supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer who faces stochastic market demand, it can be coordinated with buy back contract under some setting.
在回购契约下,可以实现供应链的协调。
3.
This paper researches the buy back contract how to coordinate the supply chain on the condition that the supplier s and the retailer s marginal costs increase with their outputs.
本文讨论在供应商和销售商的边际成本都随产量递增的情况下,回购契约是如何协调供应链的。
4) buyback contract
回购契约
1.
To the supply chain coordinating by buyback contract,formation method of feasible set for buyback contract s adjusted parameters was put forward,according to the analysis of profitability of the retailer with different choices.
对于采用回购契约进行协调的供应链,通过分析零售商在不同抉择下的获利情况,提出了修正回购契约参数的可行集构造方法。
2.
The supply chain coordination with buyback contract under uncertain demand is studied.
研究了需求不确定条件下供应链回购契约协调问题。
5) Buy-back Contract
回购契约
1.
Then a buy-back contract with effort sharing is founded to coordinate incentive discrepancy between supply chain members.
文中首先分析了在市场需求受促销活动影响情况下的集中控制模式及不合作模式的销售商最优促销努力水平和最优订购数量的决策问题;然后设计了基于回购契约的促销成本分担契约协调机制;最后通过一个算例比较了在不采取任何促销活动、不合作情况下销售商单方进行促销活动以及协调机制下销售商进行促销活动三种策略下的供应链绩效水平。
2.
To perishable products monopolization supply chain, a lot of supplier adopt buy-back contract and return policy, so it i.
而对于品牌专卖的易逝品，大多数供应商都采取了回购契约和退货政策，因此研究品牌专卖经营模式下的供应链回购协调机制有很大的实际意义。
3.
The dealing space of linear strategy between both sides is presented and supply chain coordination can be realized through using buy-back contract from the perspective of maximizing supply chain profit.
在非对称信息下,对报童问题进行了一定的拓展,并应用静态贝叶斯博弈的方法刻画了供应链中双方的价格制定过程;给出交易双方的线性策略空间,并从供应链利润最大化的角度,运用回购契约,实现供应链的协调。
6) Return Contract
回购契约
1.
It has designed the profit model of return contract,through the analysis of the profit model on supply chain,which under the control of centralization and decentralization,derived out the optimal return price range of the manufacturer and the distributor.
通过对集中和分散控制下供应链利润模型的分析,设计了供应链回购契约的利润模型,推导出了制造商和分销商最佳回购价格的取值范围。
2.
In this paper,a model of return contract for short-life-cycle products with random demand in supply chain is established,and it is used to analyze respectively the optimal decision of manufacturer and retailer with no coordination and having a return contract,then the optimal order quantity of the retailer is achieved.
在考虑易逝品的市场需求为随机需求情况下,研究了基于供应链环境下的回购契约;分别分析了零售商和制造商在没有协调情况下各自的最优决策以及在回购契约协调下双方的最优决策;推导出了在回购契约下零售商的最佳订货量。
补充资料：限制
分子式：
CAS号：
性质：一种保护细菌细胞不受外源DNA侵入的作用，通过限制性内切酶实现。该酶对双链DNA进行定点剪切。通常合成限制性内切酶的细胞由于还能合成识别同样位点的修饰酶而使细胞本身的DNA结构进行修饰，如甲基化而受到保护。当细菌受到噬菌体感染，而噬菌体DNA事先未经修饰，则这未经修饰的外来噬菌体DNA被切成小片段，再进一步为外切核酸酶所降解。未经修饰的噬菌体DNA引起感染的可能性比修饰过的噬菌体DNA要小几个数量级。
CAS号：
性质：一种保护细菌细胞不受外源DNA侵入的作用，通过限制性内切酶实现。该酶对双链DNA进行定点剪切。通常合成限制性内切酶的细胞由于还能合成识别同样位点的修饰酶而使细胞本身的DNA结构进行修饰，如甲基化而受到保护。当细菌受到噬菌体感染，而噬菌体DNA事先未经修饰，则这未经修饰的外来噬菌体DNA被切成小片段，再进一步为外切核酸酶所降解。未经修饰的噬菌体DNA引起感染的可能性比修饰过的噬菌体DNA要小几个数量级。
说明：补充资料仅用于学习参考，请勿用于其它任何用途。
参考词条