1) state-owned power generation listed companies
国有电力生产上市公司
1.
The effects of managers\' political connections on corporate performance have been empirically studied by using China\'s state-owned power generation listed companies.
本文以国有电力生产上市公司为样本探讨了国有公司高管政治关联的绩效影响。
2) state-owned public companies
国有上市公司
1.
The effectiveness of directorates of some state-owned public companies in the nonferrous industry is analyzed.
对有色金属行业国有上市公司董事会制度行为有效性进行了分析,结果表明:有色金属行业上市公司的董事会内部制度不尽合理,董事会规模偏大,董事会独立性不够,董事会成员平均年龄偏大;董事会成员的激励不到位,董事持股份额很小,报酬不平衡;董事会成员的约束乏力,在外部约束中,由于我国法律制度不健全,资本市场不完善,因此对董事的约束有限,在内部约束中,由于股权结构不合理,国家股占绝对多数,致使股东大会流于形式,监事会形同虚设。
2.
The residual claim and residual control of state-owned public companies is separate.
国有上市公司的剩余索取权和剩余控制权是分离的,在监督机制弱化、内部人控制严重的公司治理缺陷下,作为国有股东的代理人有动机和条件通过转让控制权谋取私利,处于劣势地位的受让方必然“贿赂”出让方,以期以较低的价格获得控制权这种稀缺资源,结果导致国有资产流失。
3) state-owned listed companies
国有上市公司
1.
Owing to the character of state-owned listed companies and the imperfect nature of our capital markets,many problems have arisen in the process of stock option motivation.
在国有上市公司股权激励过程中,由于国有上市企业的特性以及我国资本市场的不完善性,出现了许多的问题,重点分析了国有上市企业在实施股权激励过程中出现的问题,并提出了一些对策。
2.
This paper introduces the significance of the stock option motivation mechanism on the state-owned listed companies, points out the problems existing in the implementation of the stock option motivation mechanism, and puts forward some suggestions on perfecting the stock option motivation mechanism.
介绍了股权激励机制对国有上市公司的意义,指出了股权激励机制在实施中存在的问题,提出了完善股权激励机制的几点建议。
3.
Using the data from year 2001 to year 2005 of 388 state-owned listed companies in certain industries as the sample,on the basis of identifying over investment and analyzing the investment decision system,this paper selects ownership structure,board of directors and product market competition from corporate governance system,and discusses their effects on over investment.
以特定行业388家国有上市公司2001-2005年数据为样本,在界定过度投资水平和分析投资决策机制基础上,选取治理机制中的股权结构、董事会和产品市场竞争三方面,分析并实证检验其对过度投资的影响。
4) state-owned listed company
国有上市公司
1.
Analyze on Pecking Order of State-owned Listed Company;
国有上市公司融资顺序分析
5) non-state owned firms
国有上市公司
1.
Using data of 1026 firms listed on Chinese stock markets before the end of year 2000,this paper analyzes and compares the investment value,profitability,capital structure and corporate governance structure of state owned versus non-state owned firms between years 2001 and 2003.
鉴于学界在民营与国有上市公司的绩效、治理结构和投资价值上存在较大的争议,本文对2000年底前上市的1 026个公司在2001—2003年间的数据进行了全面的比较分析,发现:(1)民营上市公司的投资收益和账面值—市值比显著小于国有上市公司,因此具有较低的投资价值。
2.
The paper finds out: (1) Non-state owned firms have, on average, lower profitability, growth prospects, capital mobility and long-term solvency .
为了深入研究中国民营上市公司的投资价值,本文通过引入虚拟变量研究民营与国有上市公司的绩效和投资价值差异,并在此基础上使用关联变量,深入剖析两者投资价值差异的形成原因。
6) the non-listed SOE
国有非上市公司
1.
For the non-listed SOE couldn t use the same ESO incentive to solve the long-term operator incentive problem as the listed had used,and based on the principal-agent theory to point out a new incentive mode—"hypothesized stock based on profit-sharing" which combines the short-term incentive of profit-sharing plan and the long-term incentive of ESO,it could avoid the risk of stock market.
针对国有非上市公司无法使用和上市公司相同的股权激励来解决经营者激励的长期激励问题,基于委托代理理论,采用将利润分享的短期激励与股权激励的长期激励相结合的方式,提出了一种规避股票市场风险的新激励模式——"利润分享虚股制"。
补充资料：国有
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参考词条