Commercial Banks-SMES Finite Repeated Game Simulation under Complete Information

The way to reconcile the dilemma is to play infinitely repeated games under some institutional pattern,in which the two sides may possibly give up the present interests to adopt a cooperative policy for more be.

By analyzing one-time game, finite repeat game and infinite repeat game between banks and enterprises and their different results, this paper proves that only by forming a good relationship of infinite repeat game between them can their behavior be restrained, bank-firm relationship improved and nonperforming loans reduced.

After the one-shot game model and flow equilibrium solution are discussed,the behaviors of flow and congestion control based on infinite repeated game model further is studied.

Thus this paper establishes an infinite repeated game between these two market players, and solves the Nash equilibriums under four different conditions respectively, then gains two cooperating equilibriums and two non-cooperating equilibriums.