1) The Corporate Finance Association (CFA)
企业融资协会
2) enterprise financing
企业融资
1.
Enterprise financing: costs, risks and selection;
企业融资:成本、风险与选择
2.
The Choice of Enterprise Financing Ways in Our Country;
我国企业融资方式的选择
3.
The Study of Financial Leasing in Enterprise Financing;
企业融资中的金融租赁研究
3) corporation financing
企业融资
1.
Many problems exist now in corporation financing,such as single financing channel and high financing cost.
企业融资问题关乎企业的健康运营和未来的发展壮大,是一个复杂的系统工程。
2.
The financing ways are classified into two categories based on financing theories: corporation financing and project financing.
融资模式包括企业融资和项目融资两类,其中许多模式都可以灵活组合为开发区所用。
4) Firm Financing
企业融资
1.
Control Allocation in Firm Financings and Entrepreneur s Incentive;
企业融资中的控制权安排与企业家的激励
2.
Financial structure,firm financing and managerial incentive;
金融结构、企业融资与管理激励
3.
The papers put forward a periodical analysis of firm financing, on the basis of which a model the impact of shareholder s pledgeable income, manager s adverse selection and moral hazard to corporate governance and the monitoring of shareholder and agency to manager.
本文首先对企业融资进行了阶段性分析,在此基础上,通过对股东的保证收益、经营者的逆向选择和道德风险对企业治理结构的影响以及股东和中介机构对企业经营者的监督的模型化分析,探讨了新形势下对我国国企改革的启示。
5) Corporate Financing
企业融资
1.
Trade Credit:An Empirical Investigation from Corporate Financing Motivate;
商业信用:基于企业融资动机的实证研究
2.
Financial Fragility of the view of Corporate Financing and Corporate Governance;
企业融资与治理结构视角下的金融脆弱性研究
3.
From the visual angle of asset securitization being a dominant instrument of corporate financing, the thesis mainly researches the motivations of asset securitization and the optimization influence on the corporate capital structure.
论文在对企业资产证券化的概念进行界定后，回顾了国内外关于资产证券化理论的研究进展，阐述了企业资产证券化的基本理论，并提出了一个基于信息不对称的企业资产证券化模型，然后比较分析了资产证券化融资与股权融资和债权融资的区别和适用条件，接着剖析了企业资产证券化的动因，继而通过对企业资产证券化融资成本收益的定性和定量分析，论证了企业资产证券化融资对资本结构优化的影响效果；最后论述了企业资产证券化对解决我国经济转轨时期企业融资困境的作用及我国实施企业资产证券化的模式选择。
6) financing enterprises
融资企业
1.
The result of the imperfect and incomplete information dynamic game between investors and financing enterprises is perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium,which damages the benefits of investors and financing enterprises.
投资者和融资企业之间的不完美且不完全信息动态博弈,其结果为精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,这损害了投资者和融资企业的利益。
补充资料：应收帐款对企业融资的影响
应收帐款对企业融资的影响
说明：补充资料仅用于学习参考，请勿用于其它任何用途。
参考词条