On the Effectiveness of Closing Call Auction in ShenZhen Stock Exchange;

Based on the hypothesis of heterogeneous traders, this paper analyzes the strategic behaviors of informed traders and uninformed traders during the process of call auction, and discusses the impact of indicator price information disclosure and public limit order book on the call auction process.

Based on the order distribution assumption, this paper sets up a strategic trading game model of blind call auction.

The trading system that GEM of many countries adopts is divided into two kinds: One kind is a market-making system, another kind is ask-bid system.

The results indicate that if all the investors all full rational,the equilibrium price,whether using close call auction or open call auction,is the unbiased estimator of the risky assets true value.

Using the idea of minority game to characterize the trading behavior in open call auction,this paper adopt NetLogo software to simulate the transactions of both close call auction and open call auction with the mode of order cancellation.

The Effect of Open Call Auction on Chinese Stock Market Volatility;

In the paper,we use the method of financial market microstructure theory to study the price discovery process of close-and-open call auction with limited order in the framework of rational expectation.

Using the idea of minority game to characterize the trading behavior in open call auction,this paper adopt NetLogo software to simulate the transactions of both close call auction and open call auction with the mode of order cancellation.