The benefit expropriation of controlling shareholder is an important problem in corporate control theory.

We show that the optimal share ratio of the controlling shareholder as well as the optimal shareholder structure of the firm is endogenously determined,although the original reason for the controlling shareholder to finance externally is due to the deficiency of capital.

In the concentrated ownership structure, the importance of agency problem between stockholders and managers has been replaced by the agency problem between the controlling shareholders and minority stockholders.

However,the results of some newly research show that most listed companies\' ownership structures are relatively concentrative in many countries over the world,which results in interest conflict between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholder.

Based on the clearly defining of controlling minority shareholder,this paper analyzes the tunneling effects of controlling minority shareholder under private pyramid structure using the unbalanced panel data of Chinese private listed firms.

Study on the Controlling Shareholders Fiduciary Duties;

On the controlling shareholder's fiduciary duty to the company's creditors and its legal responsibility