3) incomplete information game
不完全信息博弈
1.
The paper analyze Bayes formula s application range and its certification,it also researches the formula s application especially in incomplete information game.
对Bayes公式的适用范围及证明做分析,对其应用尤其在不完全信息博弈中的应用做讨论。
2.
12 Wenchuan earthquakes,the paper further considers the quality variable and technology variable based on the exist- ing fist price sealed bid tender model,then uses the incomplete information game theory to analyze the winning-bid- with-low-priced in Chinese engineering tender market.
本文针对5·12汶川地震暴露出的我国在公共建筑工程的项目建设管理方面存在的问题,在现有的最底价格密封报价招标的理论模型基础上,进一步考虑了质量和施工技术因素,运用不完全信息博弈理论分析了我国建筑招标市场上存在的低价中标现象,由于中标企业的施工质量无法被业主完全观察到,那么以过低价格中标的施工企业在利润驱动下,必然产生施工质量低劣的道德风险问题,以及在整个建筑市场产生逆向选择现象。
4) games of incomplete information
不完全信息博弈
1.
The Industry-university-research Institute Formation Mechanism Based on Games of Incomplete Information
基于不完全信息博弈的产学研联盟形成机理研究
5) complete information static game
完全信息静态博弈
1.
This article analyzes this problem with the coalition-proof analysis in tripartite complete information static games,and the conclusion is that the benefit of the supervision company shall be more tightly combined with the project quality,and the government.
运用了三方完全信息静态博弈的防共谋均衡理论,对此类问题进行了分析,得出应将监理公司的既得利益与工程总体质量进行更紧密的挂钩,并在可能的情况下用行政方式增加监理单位共谋的成本的建议,使监理单位更充分地发挥其应有的效能。
2.
Under the condition of linear demand function,we studied the determination of output and price of products by using the method of complete information static game while second-degree price discrimination is enforced in case of three kinds of markets:one monopoly enterprise,two oligarchic enterprises,three oligarchic enterprises.
在线性需求函数条件下,就一个垄断厂商、二个寡头厂商、三个寡头厂商3种市场情形,用完全信息静态博弈的方法对实施二度价格歧视时产量和价格的确定进行了研究,并就3种市场情形在实施二度价格歧视时的歧视价、总产量、总收益、总收益增加率、消费者剩余和获取的消费者剩余率进行了比较分析。
6) incomplete information static game
不完全信息静态博弈
1.
Contraposing multi-stage venture investment projects with asymmetric information and uncertain return, considering venture capitalists investment strategies, and using incomplete information static game theory and dynamic programming method, this paper develops a compound model on exit decision to maximize utility of venture capitalists investing in debt and equity.
针对多阶段风险投资过程中信息不对称性以及收益不确定性的特征,在考虑投资策略组合的基础上,采用不完全信息静态博弈理论和动态规划方法,构造了股权债权混合投资时,目标函数为风险投资公司退出效用最大化的退出决策复合模型。
补充资料:完全信息的预期价值
完全信息的预期价值是指决策者获得完全信息所导致的预期的货币价值的增加。它是决策者为获得完全的信息而能支付的最大数量。
说明:补充资料仅用于学习参考,请勿用于其它任何用途。
参考词条