1) public-key substitute attack
公钥替换攻击
1.
Through the cryptanalysis of a threshold proxy signature scheme in literature,the scheme could not resist insider attacks and public-key substitute attacks.
对文献的门限代理签名方案进行了密码分析,发现该方案不能抵抗内部攻击和公钥替换攻击。
2.
Through the cryptanalysis of a new threshold proxy signature scheme based on bilinear pairings,it is found that the scheme can t resist forgery attack and public-key substitute attack.
对一种基于双线性对的新型门限代理签名方案进行了密码分析,发现该门限代理签名方案不能抵抗伪造攻击和公钥替换攻击。
3.
Through the cryptanalysis of threshold proxy signature scheme proposed by Huang et al(denoted as HC scheme) recently,it is found that the scheme could not resist frame attacks and public-key substitute attacks.
通过对Huang等人提出的门限代理签名方案(HC方案)进行安全性分析,发现方案不能抵抗框架攻击和公钥替换攻击。
2) public key replacement attack
替换公钥攻击
1.
That a presented proposal of efficient certificateless signature scheme is insecure against public key replacement attack is demonstrated.
给出了对一个已有的高效无证书签名方案的替换公钥攻击,表明了在该方案中,攻击者可以通过替换签名者公钥伪造签名;进而针对该攻击提出了改进方案。
2.
It is found that the three schemes are all insecure against public key replacement attack.
对最近提出的2个在随机预言模型中可证安全的无证书签名方案和1个在标准模型中可证安全的无证书签名方案进行安全性分析,指出这3个方案不能抵抗替换公钥攻击的安全隐患,在这种攻击下攻击者能够生成新的公钥满足合法签名者生成的合法签名。
3.
The certificateless signature scheme can suffer from public key replacement attack so that any one can forge a valid signature on any message.
该方案能受到替换公钥攻击,以至于任何人都能对任何消息成功伪造签名。
3) key substitution attacks
密钥替换攻击
1.
This paper shows that the two short signature schemes provably secure in the standard model are all insecure against key substitution attacks under the multi-user setting,namely an adversary can generate a new public key satisfying legitimate signatures created by the legitimate signer.
针对在标准模型下可证安全的两个短签名方案,该文指出这两个方案在多用户环境下是不安全的,不能抵抗密钥替换攻击,即一个攻击者能够生成一个新公钥满足合法签名者生成的合法签名。
4) substitution attack
替换攻击
1.
Assuming that the encoding rules are chosen according to a uniform probability distribution, the probabilities P I and P S of a successful impersonation attack and a successful substitution attack, respectively, of this code are also computed.
计算了认证码的参数 ,并在假定按照等概率分布来选择编码规则下 ,计算了成功模仿攻击概率PI 和成功替换攻击概率PS,它们都达到了最优或接近最优 ,为实现一些好的实用认证技术在理论上提供了可靠的基础 ,也给出了构造Cartesian认证码的技巧 。
2.
On assuming that encoding rules are chosen according to a uniform probability distribution,the probabilities of a successful impersonation attack and a successful substitution attack of these codes are also computed respectively.
并在假定按照等概率分布来选择编码规则下,求出了认证码的成功的模仿攻击概率和成功的替换攻击概率。
3.
Assuming that the encoding rules are chosen according to a uniform probability distribution, the probabilities P I and P S of a successful impersonation attack and a successful substitution attack, respectively, of this code are computed.
计算了认证码的参数 ,并假定按照等概率分布选择编码规则 ,计算了成功模仿攻击概率PI 和成功替换攻击概率PS,它们都达到了最优或接近最优 。
5) Key Replacement Attack
密钥代替攻击
6) secret key attacking
密钥攻击
补充资料：替换
1.把原来的(工作着的人﹑使用着的衣物等)调换下来;倒换。
说明：补充资料仅用于学习参考，请勿用于其它任何用途。
参考词条