1) Stackelberg game
主从博弈
1.
Research on Stackelberg Game of a Supply Chain with Uncertain Demand of Perishable Goods;
易逝品需求不确定的供应链主从博弈问题
2.
Under uncertain demand,this phenomenon was studied by Stackelberg game and Bayesian methods.
在需求不确定情形下,用主从博弈和贝叶斯方法对此现象进行研究,发现制造商调高其需求规模预测值将导致电子渠道和零售渠道的价格升高,电子渠道的需求减少,而制造商给予零售商的单位补贴与电子渠道和零售渠道的价格正相关,与电子渠道的需求负相关,但不影响零售渠道的需求。
2) Stackelberg Game Theory
Stackelberg主从博弈
3) two-person leader and follower game
二人主从博弈
1.
In this paper, we fristly generalized definition about two-person leader and follower game.
本文首先将具有有限或混合策略空间的二人主从博弈的定义推广到无限维策略空间上的主从博弈,并且在多人主从博弈中以三人主从博弈为典型情形,进行了类似的推广,这些推广是本文研究的基础。
4) many-person leader and follower
多人主从博弈
1.
Next, we make the three-person leader and follower into a standard type of many-person leader and follower,and we give out generaliztion of there-person leader and follower game which is familiar with generaliztion of two-person leader and follower game.
本文首先将具有有限或混合策略空间的二人主从博弈的定义推广到无限维策略空间上的主从博弈,并且在多人主从博弈中以三人主从博弈为典型情形,进行了类似的推广,这些推广是本文研究的基础。
5) two-stage leaders and followers game
两阶段主从博弈
1.
And then the two-stage leaders and followers game problem G with the parametric Nash equilibrium constraints was given.
首先给出带参数的纳什均衡问题Γ(x),在此基础上给出了具有带参数的纳什均衡约束的两阶段主从博弈问题G。
6) subjective game
主观博弈
1.
This paper analyzes the dynamic influencing factors that decide the demission of employees by using the four-phase subjective game model.
运用四个发展阶段的主观博弈概念性分析框架,分析了决定国有企业员工离职行为的各种动态影响因素。
2.
This paper analyses the root of mass unexpected incident used subjective game theory.
本文运用主观博弈模型分析了我国群体性突发事件的产生根源。
补充资料：主从
1.主人与仆从。 2.主要的和从属的。
说明：补充资料仅用于学习参考，请勿用于其它任何用途。
参考词条