Three buy-back contract mechanisms of supply chain are proposed in collaboration with return logistics cost burdened by retailers, suppliers or both parties.

The article demonstrates the non-reasonability of buy-back contract mechanism of traditional supply chain,puts forward to adopt Stackelberg model and Nash negotiation model to design buy-back contract.

In this paper,a constrained buy back contract which can avoid these flaws is put forward,and a numerical example is given at last.

In a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain facing stochastic sales effort dependent demand,it is proved that supply chain coordination can not be achieved by using traditional buy back contract when retailer is a leader and supplier is a follower.

For two stage supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer who faces stochastic market demand, it can be coordinated with buy back contract under some setting.

This paper researches the buy back contract how to coordinate the supply chain on the condition that the supplier s and the retailer s marginal costs increase with their outputs.

To the supply chain coordinating by buyback contract,formation method of feasible set for buyback contract s adjusted parameters was put forward,according to the analysis of profitability of the retailer with different choices.

The supply chain coordination with buyback contract under uncertain demand is studied.

Then a buy-back contract with effort sharing is founded to coordinate incentive discrepancy between supply chain members.

To perishable products monopolization supply chain, a lot of supplier adopt buy-back contract and return policy, so it i.

The dealing space of linear strategy between both sides is presented and supply chain coordination can be realized through using buy-back contract from the perspective of maximizing supply chain profit.

It has designed the profit model of return contract,through the analysis of the profit model on supply chain,which under the control of centralization and decentralization,derived out the optimal return price range of the manufacturer and the distributor.

In this paper,a model of return contract for short-life-cycle products with random demand in supply chain is established,and it is used to analyze respectively the optimal decision of manufacturer and retailer with no coordination and having a return contract,then the optimal order quantity of the retailer is achieved.