Contraposing multi-stage venture investment projects with asymmetric information and uncertain return, considering venture capitalists investment strategies, and using incomplete information static game theory and dynamic programming method, this paper develops a compound model on exit decision to maximize utility of venture capitalists investing in debt and equity.

This article analyzes this problem with the coalition-proof analysis in tripartite complete information static games,and the conclusion is that the benefit of the supervision company shall be more tightly combined with the project quality,and the government.

Under the condition of linear demand function,we studied the determination of output and price of products by using the method of complete information static game while second-degree price discrimination is enforced in case of three kinds of markets:one monopoly enterprise,two oligarchic enterprises,three oligarchic enterprises.

By setting up a static game model of perfect information and making a quantitative analysis,the Nash equilibrium of pure strategies between the party and the attorney agent and the possible decisions of both sides in this non-cooperative game can be deduced,and the cause of the charge for risk agency can be found.

With the help of microeconomics theory and game theory,the paper establishes an anti-dumping model assuming business enterprises and government are under static game of complete information.

By the analysis of two-state dynamic game of incomplete information,the manager will be effortless intensively so it can depress the reality-profit in order to prevent the competitors enter.

Based on the transformation of Barro and Vickers model,with the research method of incomplete information dynamic game theory,the paper proposed a game theory model between the real estate developers and buyers under the hypothesis of rational expectations.

In this paper, we analyzed the influence of central government assistance on non- performing loans of state- owned banks by means of incomplete information dynamic game.

Under China s current individual income tax system,there exists incomplete information dynamic game among withholding tax collector,tax payer and tax collector.